The Pooled OLS model is used to analyze whether governance structure such as family ownership, management, and control can actually influence R & D investment in Chinese family firms by application of the listed companies from the CSMAR database. After controlling for size, debt, age, profitability and growth, the positive impacts of family ownership and family management on R & D and the negative impact of family control on R & D are found. The other research question explored is whether the moderating effects of institution environment exist in the sample. Institution environment variable and its intersection terms with governance structure are added to the models respectively. Meanwhile, the positive impacts of family ownership and family management on R & D are weaker while the negative impact of family control is weaker provincially in a better institution environment. Regarding the institution environment itself, it shows a consistent positive impact on R & D investment. Meanwhile a substitution effect between the institution environment and the family governance structure is found.
Introduction
R & D investment is considered as the fundamental decision in firms' innovation around the world [1] . It advances product, technology and then helps firms to be more market competitive and profitable [2] [3] . Because of the important role of [4] , firm size [5] [6] , firm strategy [7] [8] , CEO characteristics [3] [4] and firm's financial status [9] [10] . The most complicated but important determinant of R & D investment is firm governance structure since it links R & D investment to agency problems [1] .
Existing literatures have noticed the impact of firm ownership types [11] , ownership concentration [12] and board independence [13] on R & D investment in normal firms. However, given the fact that family firms are dominant in most economies in the world today, especially in Asian countries [14] [15] and family business studies have verified the great contribution of family firms to innovation and economic growth [16] , whether the governance structure can actually affect R & D investment in family firm is still short of research. Moreover, governance structure in family firm varies in modes of family involvement. Although previous studies point out major governance characteristics in family firm are family ownership [15] [17] , family management [18] and family control [19] , they fail to clarify these concepts and there is no complete analysis including all three dimensions in family firm. Additionally, institution environment deserves more attentions for investigating the impacts of family ownership, Chinese economy currently shows a huge demand for studies about R & D investment in family firms. After 2004, more state owned enterprises have been turning to be family firms since private ownership has higher incentive to innovate and develop. Due to the comparative advantage in cheap production factors such as labor and land, Chinese family firms transfer from manufacturer to innovator in the future and improve governance quality. Furthermore, as a transition economy, the institution development in China has significant regional difference. Specifically, southeastern area and coastal provinces in China have built better institution systems, such as effective government intervention, stronger legal protection and enforcement and available financial market accessibility. The regional disparity in institution environments may play a key role on family firm strategic actions like R & D investment.
Overall, this paper contributes to the literature by investigating the impacts of governance structure on R & D investment in Chinese family firms. First I use family ownership, management and control to provide clear dimensions of family involvement in governance structure. Then I develop the hypothesis by matching family ownership, management and control with R & D investment through agency theory. There are two agency problems documented here. The leading one is principal-agent conflicts between owner (the principal) and manager (the agent) [22] . Long term oriented owner prefers to invest more on R & D for high expected future benefits and gaining more external monitoring by the The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops hypothesis on the impact of family ownership, management and control on R & D investment in Chinese family firms; then develop the hypothesis of the moderating effects of institutions environment. Section 3 describes the data selection, variable definitions. Section 4 is empirical methods, descriptive statistics and regression results. Section 5 is conclusion. 
Hypothesis Development

Research Design
Data
The sample has two data sources. The target data set of this paper is finally generated by matching the marketization data with family firm data by provinces.
Variable Description
R & D intensity is dependent variable in regression models. It's measured as the ratio of R & D expenditures to the total assets following the standard analysis. In this paper, three independent variables, family ownership, family management and family control, are discussed. Family ownership is the number of shares held by family members divided by the total shares outstanding. Family management is a dummy variable which is coded as 1 if a family member as the CEO, and otherwise. Family control is a dummy variable as well, coded as 1 if the firm has a pyramid structure and otherwise. Five control variables and one moderator are considered in this paper. Firm size is controlled and measured as the logarithm of the number of employees. Debt is controlled and measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets. Age is measured as the logarithm of the years that family firm had been in existence. Profitability is measured as return on assets. Growth is measured as percentage annual growth of sales. Moderator is institution environment which is measured as marketization index for 31 provinces. (these two numbers are reported in logarithm form in Table 2 ). Average debt is 0.2786, average profitability is 0.0761 and average growth 1.02%. Average marketization index, marked as institution, is 9.1722 for 31 provinces in China. Ta Note: *, **, ***represent significant results associated with P < 0.1, P < 0.05, and P < 0.01. 2) The Moderating Effects of Institution Environments Note: *, **, ***represent significant results associated with P < 0.1, P < 0.05, and P < 0.01. The result might be justified by the fact that family firms have higher propensity to diffuse their share and hire non family CEO in better institution environment.
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